Within the transferable belief model, positive basic belief masses can be allocated to the empty set. leading to unnormalized belief functions. The nature of these unnormalized beliefs is analyzed.
INTRODUCTION.
In subjective probability theory, a probability space (Q, JQ., P) is characterized by a set of worlds n, a Boolean algebra 4! of subsets of Q and a probability measure P defmed on JQ.. Let m be the world that corresponds to the actual sate of affairs. We ignore which world corresponds tom. We only know the strength P(A) of our belief that me A, for all Ae JQ.. The normalization of P is an axiom of the theory: P(Q) = 1.
In the transferable belief model (TBM), the model we developed to quantify beliefs and that covers the same domain of application as the subjective probability measures, we distinguish between an open-world and a close-world context (Smets 1988, Smets and Kennes 1990) . In the open-world context beliefs are not necessarily normalized. The nature of this possible lack of normalization is analysed in this paper.
The TBM is characterized by an unitary mass of belief that is distributed among the subsets of a finite frame of discernment n. For At;;; ; Q, m(A) is the portion of our total initial belief supporting A l and that could support For all A t;;; ; Q, bel( A) (read the belief of A) represents the degree of justified specific support given to A and pi (A) (read the plausibility of A) represems the degree of potential specific support that could be given to A.
We say specific because the bbm's m(X) included in bel( A) are those that support A without supporting A. Hence X must be a subset of A without being a subset of A, i.e. X¢0. So m(0) is not included in bel(A).
Identically it is not included in pi(A) as pi(A) includes the bbm given to sets X compatib1e with A, and 0 is not compatible with A. The fact that, after such a conditioning, the updated belief given to A will be equal to pl(A) reflects the fact that pl(A) is the maximal support that might be given to A. In particular, subsets X<:: Q for which it is accepted that me X receive a null plausibility. If it was not the case, then appropriate updating could induce a positive support to X, thus making supported worlds that were accepted as not including m.
An important element of the TBM is the acknowledgement that a positive bbm can be allocated to the empty set or equivalently that bel(Q) and pl(Q) can both be less than one. The bbm m(0) can be viewed as a missing mass as it is equal to 1-pl(Q). On the contrary, Shafer (1976) defines a belief function such that m(0)"'0 or equivalently bel(O);;; ; pl(Q)"'l.
In order to analyse the nature of m(0)>0, we define the nature of the frame of discernment in section 2. In section 3, we explain the conditioning process used in the TBM.
In section 4, we explain the origin of the positive bbm given to 0. In section 5, we analyse the case where the frame of discernment is not exhaustive. We summarize the results in section 6.
2. THE FRAME OF DISCERNMENT.
In the TBM, bel quantifies the strength of the beliefs held by a given agent Y at a given time t that an actual state of affairs m belongs to subsets of possible worlds. The domain of Y's beliefs at time t is a set of distinct possible worlds, one of them, denoted m, corresponds to the actual state of affairs (Carnap 1956 , 1962 , Ruspini 1986 ). This set, is denoted by OLand called the frame of discernment.
It is defined as follows. In this section, we describe the impact of a new pieces of evidence within the TBM. Let OL be a frame of discernment. A piece of evidence lA is added to EC7 and IA is such that Y takes for grant that me A.
In the TBM, the bbm given to XCOL is transferred to
XnA. When XnA�. this transfer reflects tlu: nature of the TBM and its masses: a bbm given to a set X is a part of belief that supports X and might support any subset of 
UPDATING BELIEFS.
Let nL be the frame of discernment on which Y builds his/her beliefs at time t. Let m be the bba that quantifies these beliefs that result from EC7. We want to explain the meaning of m(0)>0 as encountered in the TBM updating.
4.1. Let us suppose that Y learns the piece of evidence l A that the worlds in A happen to be impossible, with A t;:;; QL, A'#0. Let bel' be the result of the updating of bel by this pieces of evidence, whereas belA is the updating obtained in the TBM. bel' is the belief function that results from EC7 u{I A )· We give our reason why bel'
should be belA.
The transfer of the bbm m(X), Xt;:;; 9 to XnA is accepted when XnA�. as this transfer is at the core of the TBM.
What has to be justified is the transfer of bel( A) to mA(0) and the non-normalization. For the homomorphisme requirement (Gardenfors, 1988), consider two belief functions bel' and bel" defined on a frame of discernment nL and a random device which outcome indicates which belief function is selected. Let p be the probability of bel' being selected and let q=1-p be the probability that bel" is selected. Let bel be the belief function on nL resulting from the overall schema, so bel(X) = p bei'(X) + q bel"(X) 'v'Xt;:;; QL (proved in Smets 1990b). The homomorphisme requirement states that the same relation should hold whatever the conditioning subset:
Homomorphisme requirement :
'v'Xt;:;; QL, \1' At;:;; QL 
where the g functions can depend on the belief function considered.
Given bel(X) = p be l'(X) + (1-p) bel"(X), the last relation becomes: We have argued that conditioning on the information lA = 'the worlds in A are impossible' can result in the transfer of bel( A) to mA(0). The information lA was added to Ec; , Y's evidential corpus at time t, and mA was the resulting bba induced by EC� u{IA}. Before lA was added to EC7, how to justify that the bbm m(0) induced by EC;' could already be positive? It is due to the fact that the bba induced by Ec; might already result from a conditioning on the pieces of evidence that were present in 
THE EPISTEMIC CONSTRUCT OF THE FRAME OF DISCERNMENT.
We already studied the belief induced on a frame of discernment QL derived from a propositional language L.
In practice, the frame of discernment can also be built by (Laskey and Lehner, 1989) . In the last example, where m(0)= 1, it is obvious that Y should reconsider the impact of the two pieces of evidence Ev1 and Evz, trying to discount or eliminate the 'most unreliable' one. When l>m(0)>0, the largest m(0) the more seriously Y should reconsider how his evidential corpus influence his beliefs, but there is of course no real crisp limit between values of m(0) that would correspond to acceptable conflict, and those that would not. It is a matter of degree. The way to update the impact of the evidential corpus in order to reduce the conflicts on .Q require information external to the model. It is not considered in this paper.
6.2. The second question is concerned with beliefs induced by randomness. Suppose a random device generates the mutually exclusive and exhaustive events OOj, i=l, 2, ... n with probabilities Pi· Should we quantify our belief that event OO i will occur as bel(ro i ) = P i ? Does randomness warrants support? These questions are left open. It seems that the Pi's are the pignistic probabilities induced on .Q by an underlying belief on Q (Smets 1990b). If the P i 'S are not equal, it seems to reflect that the evidential corpus justifies some beliefs on some subset of n.
The aim of this paper was not to solve all the open questions in relation to m(0)>0, but to provide a meaning for it. There are still pending questions that will be studied in future papers.
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